We establish a network formation game for the Internet's autonomous system (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. In this game, the utility of a player depends on the network structure, e.g., the distances between nodes and the cost of links. Our model is versatile and can accommodate various configurations: whether monetary transfers are allowed, whether survivability requirements are imposed or not, and if so, whether failures are frequent or rare. We analyze static properties of the game as well as its dynamic evolution. We provide a dynamic analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some "network motifs" in the Internet connectivity graph. We assess our predictions with real-world data.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE structure of communication networks, in particular that of the Internet, has carried much interest. The Internet is a living example of a large, self organized, complex system. Understanding the processes that shape its topology would provide tools for engineering its future.
The Internet is assembled out of multiple Autonomous Systems (ASs), which are contracted by different economic agreements. These, in turn, compose the routing pathways among the ASs. With some simplifications, we can represent the resulting network as a graph, where two nodes (ASs) are connected by a link if traffic is allowed to traverse through them. The statistical properties of this "Internet graph", such as the clustering properties, degree distribution etc., have been thoroughly investigated [1] . However, without proper understanding of the mechanism that led to this structure, the statistical analysis alone lacks the ability to either predict the future evolution of the Internet nor to shape its evolution.
A large class of models, a primary example is the "preferential attachment" model, use probabilistic rules in order to simulate the network evolution and recover some of its statistical properties, e.g., its degree distribution. Yet, these models fail to account for many other features of the network [2] . Possibly, one of the main reasons for that is they treat the ASs as passive elements rather than economic, profitmaximizing entities. An agent-based approach is a promising alternative. and obtaining bounds on the "price of anarchy" and "price of stability". These metrics measure from above and below, correspondingly, the social cost deterioration at an equilibrium compared with a (socially) optimal solution. Nonetheless, the vast majority of these studies assume that the players are identical, whereas the Internet is a heterogeneous mixture of various entities, such as CDNs, minor ISPs, tier-1 ASs etc. There are only a few studies that have explicitly considered the effects of heterogeneity on the network structure. Some examples include [9] , and in the context of social networks, [10] .
Most of the studies on the application of game theory to networks, with very few exceptions, e.g., [11] , focused on static properties of the game. This is particularly true for network formation games. However, it is not clear that the Internet has reached an equilibrium. Indeed, ASs continuously draw new contracts, some merge with others while other quit business. In fact, a dynamic inspection of the inter-AS network suggests that the system may be far from equilibrium. Therefore, a dynamic study of an inter-AS network formation game is needed.
In addition, previous work ignores an important requirement that Autonomous Systems has -reliability. Indeed, failures occur, and an AS must face such events. While some game theoretic works addressed reliability in other contexts ( [12] , [13] ), to the best of our knowledge, there are no works that considered the topological properties that emerge in a heterogeneous, dynamic, network formation game with reliability constraints.
We establish an analytically-tractable model, which explicitly accounts for the heterogeneity of players as well as reliability requirements. We base our model on the heralded Fabrikant model ( [14] , [15] ). We model the inter-AS connectivity as a network formation game with heterogeneous players that may share costs by monetary transfers. We account for the inherent bilateral nature of the agreements between players, by 0733-8716 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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noting that the establishment of a link requires the agreement of both nodes at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally. As reliability comes into play, agents may require to be connected to other agents, or to all the other agents in the network, by at least two disjoint paths. We investigate both the static properties of the resulting game as well as its dynamic evolution. Game theoretic analysis is dominantly employed as a "toy model" for contemplating about real-world phenomena. It is rarely confronted with real-world data. In this study we go a step further from traditional formal analysis, and we do consider real inter-AS topology data analysis to support our theoretical findings.
The main contributions of this paper, which summarizes the findings in [16] and [17] , are:
• We evaluate static properties of the considered game, such as the prices of anarchy and stability and characterize additional properties of the equilibrium topologies. We introduce the concept of "price of reliability", which is defined as the ratio of the social cost with reliability constraints to the social cost with no such additional constraints. Surprisingly, we show that this price can be smaller than one, namely, that the additional reliability requirements may increase the social utility. • We discuss the dynamic evolution of the inter-AS network, and calculate convergence rates for the different final states. Our findings provide insight towards incentive design schemes. Our model predicts the existence of a settlement-free clique, and that most of the other contracts between players include monetary transfers. • We provide dynamical analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some "network motifs", i.e., sub-graphs that appear frequently in the network. Through real-world data, we provide encouraging support to our predictions. In the next section, we describe our model. We discuss multiple variants, corresponding to whether utility transfers (e.g., monetary transfers) are allowed or not, and whether reliability constraints are in effect. In Section 3, we provide static analysis. Dynamic analysis is presented in Section 4. In section 5 we compare our theoretical predictions with realworld data on inter-AS topologies. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6. Each claim is followed by its proof's sketch, and full proofs and additional technical details can be found online [18] .
II. MODEL We assume that each AS is a player. While there are many types of players, we aggregate them into two types: major league (or type-A) players, such as major ISPs, central search engines and the likes, and minor league (or type-B) players, such as local ISP or small enterprises. Each player may form contracts with other players, and should they reach a mutual understanding, a link between them is formed. A player's strategy is set by specifying which links it is interested in establishing, and, if permissible, the price it will be willing to pay for each.
We denote the set of type-A (type B) player by T A (T B ). A link connecting node i to node j is denoted as either (i, j ) or i j. The total number of players is N = |T A | + |T B |, and we assume N ≥ 3. The shortest distance between nodes i and j is the minimal number of hops along a path connecting them and is denoted by d(i, j ). Finally, the degree of node i is denoted by deg(i ).
A. Basic Model
Our cost function is based on the cost structure in [14] and [15] . Players are penalized for their distance from other players. First and foremost, players require a good, fast connection to the major players, while they may relax their connection requirements to minor players. Bandwidth usage and delay depends heavily on the hop distance, and connection quality is represented by this metric. The relative importance of a major player is weighted by a factor A > 1 in the cost function in the corresponding distance term. The link prices represent factors such as the link's maintenance costs, bandwidth allocation costs etc. Different player types may incur different link costs, c A , c B , due to varying financial resources or infrastructure. Formally, the (dis-)utility of players is represented as follows.
where A > 1 represents the relative importance of class A nodes over class B nodes. The social cost is defined as
The optimal (minimal) social cost is denoted as S (bare) optimal (for brevity, S optimal ).
We denote the the social cost at the optimal stable solution asS optimal . The price of stability is the ratio between the social cost at the best stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, namely PoS =S optimal /S optimal . Similarly, denote byS pessimal the highest social cost in an equilibrium. Then, the price of anarchy is the ratio between the social cost at the worst stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, namely Po A =S pessimal /S optimal .
We denote the change in cost of player i after the addition (removal) of a link ( j, k) by
The establishment of a link requires the bilateral agreement of the two parties at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally. This is known as a pairwise-stable equilibrium [11] , [19] .
Definition 2: The players' strategies are pairwise-stable if for all i, j ∈ T A ∪ T B , the following hold:
The resulting graph is referred to as a stabilizable graph. In many cases, ASs must maintain access to the Internet in case of a single link failure. This is tantamount to the requirement that all the players must have at least two link disjoint paths to each other node. If survivability constraints are in effect, we generalize the basic model by modifying the distance term in the cost function, and adding a term representing the distance along the backup path. Nevertheless, if either link prices are high, crash frequencies are low or the content of a minor AS is of little value, players may relax their reliability requirements and demand disjoint paths only to the major players. This is represented by a binary parameter τ , which is set to one if two disjoint paths are required to all nodes, and zero if the reliability requirement holds for major players only.
The relative weight of the primary path and the backup path is set by the parameter δ. If failures are often, then the regular and backup paths (in the corresponding pair of linkdisjoint paths) are used almost as frequently. As such, they must be weighted the same in the cost function. In this case, the likelihood of using either route is the same, and δ = 1. Conversely, if failures are rare, traffic will be mostly carried across the shorter path. Therefore, its length should carry more weight in the cost than the length of the backup route, hence δ 1.
Definition 3 (Cost Function Under Survivability Constraints):
The cost function,
where d(i, j ) and d (i, j ) are the lengths of a pair of paths between i, j that minimizes the cost function. d(i, j ) denotes the length of the shorter path. Formally, denote a pair of disjoint paths connecting player i and player j as
is the length of shorter (correspondingly, longer) path. Set
We denote the change in cost of player i as after the addition (removal) of a link ( j, k) by
If δ = 1, then the two routing pathways are used the same. In this case, the shortest cycle length d(i, j ) + d (i, j ) is the relevant quantity that appears in the cost function. This can be found in polynomial time by Suurballe's algorithm ( [20] , [21] ). However, if δ 1, routing will occur along two disjoint paths, such that the length of the shortest between the two is shortest (among all pairs of disjoint paths). Although the complexity of finding this pair is NP-Hard, first finding the shortest path and then finding the next shortest path is a heuristic that works remarkably well, both in the real-world data analysis and on the networks derived in the theoretical discussion. The reason behind this is that, when failures are rare, information is predominantly routed along the shortest path. When players are required to establish a fall-back route, they will establish a path that is disjoint from the current routing path, namely the shortest one.
The additional reliability requirements result in additional link expenses, as for example, the degree of every node needs to be at least two. The price of reliability is the ratio between the optimal social cost under the additional survivability constraint to the optimal social cost when the additional constraints are removed.
Definition 4: The price of reliability (PoR) is the ratio between the optimal value of the social costs among the set of corresponding stable equilibria, PoR =S optimal /S (bare) optimal . Surprisingly, we shall show that there exist scenarios in which reliability requirements increase the social utility, so that the price of reliability can be smaller than one.
B. Utility Transfer
In the above formulation, we have implicitly assumed that players may not transfer utilities. However, often players are able to do so, in particular via monetary transfers. We incorporate such possibility by introducing an extended model, allowing for a monetary transaction in which player i pays player j some amount P i j iff the link (i. j ) is established. Player j sets a minimal price w i j and if P i j ≥ w i j the link is formed. The corresponding change to the cost function is as follows.
Definition 5: The cost function of player i when monetary transfers are allowed isC(i ) C(i ) + j,i j ∈E P i j − P j i . In this definition the cost C(i ) may be either C (reliable) (i ) or C (bare) (i ).
Monetary transfer allows the sharing of costs. Without transfers, a link will be established only if both parties, i and j , reduce their costs, C(i, E +i j) < 0 and C( j, E +i j) < 0. Consider, for example, a configuration where C(i, E + i j) < 0 and C( j, E + i j) > 0. It may be beneficial for player i to offer a lump sum P i j to player j if the latter agrees to establish (i, j ). This will be feasible only if the cost function of both players is reduced. It immediately follows that if C(i, E + i j) + C(i, E + i j) < 0 then there is a value P i j such that this condition is met. Hence, it is beneficial for both players to establish a link between them. In a game theoretic formalism, if the core of the two players game is non-empty, then they may pick a value out of this set as the transfer amount. Likewise, if the core is empty, or C(i, E + i j) + C( j, E + i j) > 0, then the best response of at least one of the players is to remove the link, and the other player has no incentive to offer a payment high enough to change its decision. Formally:
Corollary 6: When monetary transfers are allowed, the link
Our model is versatile and can accommodate various setups. There are three key parameters: c A , c B and A. In the remainder of the paper we address different scenarios that are distinguished according to different configurations: whether monetary transfers are allowed, whether reliability requirements are in effect or not, and if so, whether failures are frequent or rare (controlled by δ) and survivability constraints are symmetric or not (controlled by τ ). In the remainder of the paper, whenever monetary transfers are feasible, we state it explicitly, otherwise the basic model (without transfers or survivability constraints) is assumed.
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the properties of stable equilibria. Specifically, we first establish that, under certain conditions, the major players group together in a clique (section III-A). We shall further discuss topological properties that emerge from our analysis (section III-B).
As a metric for the quality of the solution we apply the commonly used measure of the social cost, which is the sum of individual costs. We evaluate the price of anarchy and the price of stability (Section III-C). We introduce utility transfers in section III-D, and consider the impact of survivability requirements on the prices of stability and anarchy in section III-E.
A. The Type-A Clique
If the link's cost is extremely low, every player would establish links with all other players [14] . The resulting graph will be a clique. This is not a realistic setting.
Lemma 7: The longest distance between any node i and node j ∈ T B is bounded by
In addition, if c A < A then there is a link between every two type-A nodes.
Proof's Sketch (Details in [18] ): If two nodes are at a distance L + 1 of each other, then there is a path with L nodes connecting them. By establishing a link at a cost c, we are shortening the distance between a node at the line's end to ∼ L/2 nodes that lay on the other side of the line. The average reduction in distance is also ≈ L/2. We bound L by comparing L 2 ≈ 4c. Lemma 7 indicates that if 1 < c A < A the type A nodes will form a clique (the "nucleolus" of the network). The type B nodes form structures that are connected to the type A clique (the network nucleolus). These structures are not necessarily trees and will not necessarily connect to a single type-A node only. This is indeed found in many realistic configurations.
If c A > A then the type-A clique is no longer stable. This setting does not correspond to the observed nature of the inter-AS topology and we shall focus in all the following sections on the case 1 < c A < A.
B. Equilibria's Properties
Here we describe common properties of all pair-wise equilibria. We start by noting that, unlike the findings of several other studies [11] , [22] , [23] , the type-B nodes in our model are not necessarily organized in trees. This is shown in the next example.
Example 8: Assume for simplicity that c A = c B = c. Consider a line of length k of type B nodes,
In addition, the links ( j 1 , 1) and ( j 2 , k) exist, where j 1 , j 2 ∈ T A , i.e., the line is connected at both ends to different Fig. 1 . Nonoptimal networks. The type-A clique is in blue squares, the type-B players are in red circles. a) The network described in Example 8. b) A poor equilibrium, as described in [24] . nodes of the type-A clique, as depicted in Fig 1. In [24] we show that this is a stabilizable graph. Intuitively, the line is short enough so no major player will agree to establish an additional link to any of the minor player in it, but long enough so no minor player in it would benefit from disconnecting a link.
A stable network cannot have two "heavy" trees, "heavy" here means that there is a deep sub-tree with many nodes, as it would be beneficial to make a shortcut between the two subtrees (details appear in [24] ). Namely, trees must be shallow and small. This means that, while there are many equilibria, in all of them nodes cannot be too far apart, i.e., a small-world property.
C. Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
As there are many possible link-stable equilibria, a discussion of the price of anarchy is in place. Although we explicitly find the optimal configuration, it is also worthwhile to consider the limiting case of a large network,
Typically, the number of major league players is much smaller than the other players, and we consider the limit |T B | |T A | 1. Proposition 9: Consider the network where the type B nodes are connected to a specific node j ∈ T A of the type-A clique. The social cost in this stabilizable network ( Fig. 2(a) ) is
Moreover, if A+1
2 ≤ c then this network structure is socially optimal and the price of stability is 1, otherwise the price of stability is
then the price of stability is asymptotically 1.
Proof's Sketch (Details in [18] ): We show that this network ( Fig. 2(a) ) is immune to a removal of a link connecting a minor player as it will disconnect the type-B node. For every player j and i ∈ T B , any additional link (i, j ) will result in C( j, E + i j) ≥ c B − 1 > 0 since the link only reduces the distance d(i, j ) from 2 to 1. Additionally, the type-A clique is stable (Lemma 7). Hence, this network is stabilizable. This configuration is optimal as the social utility of every minor player (constrained to a single link with the set of major Fig. 2 . The optimal solution, as described in Lemma 9. If ( A + 1) /2 < c the optimal solution is described by a), otherwise by b). When monetary transfers (section III-D) are allowed, both configurations are stabilizable. Otherwise, only a) is stabilizable. player) is maximized, and the sum of social utilities of the major players is maximal as well.
Next, we evaluate the price of anarchy. The result in the large network limit is presented by the following proposition.
Proof's Sketch [18] : We evaluate the social cost in a stabilizable network in which the minor player form long strands connected to a major player (Fig 1) . The ratio between this value and the optimal social cost constitutes a lower bound on the price of anarchy. An upper bound is obtained by examining the social cost in any topology that satisfies Lemma 7, which bounds the distance between nodes. We then show that the social cost is dominated by the mean minorplayer-to-minor-player distances, and that the former network achieves the maximal mean distance.
D. Monetary Transfers
Monetary transfers allow for a redistribution of costs. It is well known in the game theoretic literature that, in general, this process increases the social welfare. Indeed, the next proposition indicates an improvement on Proposition 9.
Proposition 11: The price of stability is 1. If A+1 2 ≤ c , then Proposition 9 holds. Furthermore, if A+1 2 > c, then the optimal stable state is such that all the type B nodes are connected to all nodes of the type-A clique. In the latter case, the social cost of this stabilizable network is S =
Proof's Sketch [18] : In Proposition 9 the optimal networks for the two cases are evaluated explicitly. In the proof we show that, unlike the case where monetary transfers are forbidden, the optimal network is stabilizable even if A+1 2 > c. Without monetary transfers, the additional links in the optimal state ( Fig. 2(b) ), connecting a major league player with a minor league player, are unstable as the type-A players lack an incentive to maintain them. By allowing monetary transfers, the minor players can compensate the major players for the increase in their costs. It is worthwhile to do so only if the core of the two-player is non-empty. The existence or removal of an additional link does not inflict on any other player, as the distance between every two players is at most two. Taking the large network limit concludes the proof.
Next, we show that, under mild conditions on the number of type-A nodes, the price of anarchy is 3/2, i.e., a fixed number that does not depend on any parameter value.
Theorem 12: The maximal distance of a type-B node from a node in the type-A clique is
1 then the price of anarchy is upper-bounded by 3/2.
Proof's Sketch [18] : As the number of major players increases, the minor player's motivation to establish a direct connection to the clique increases, since such a link reduces the distance to all clique members. As the incentive increases, players are willing to pay more for this link, thus increasing, in turn, the utility of the link in a major player's perspective. With enough major players, all the minor players will establish direct links to the clique. Therefore, any stable equilibrium will result in a compact network with a diameter of at most three.
The maximal distance of a type-B player to the type-A clique depends inversely on the number of nodes in the clique and the number of players in general. The number of ASs increases in time, and we may assume the number of type-A players follows. Therefore, we expect a decrease of the mean "node-core distance" in time. Our data analysis (Section V) indicates that this real-world distance indeed decreases in time.
E. The Effect of Survivability
One may have guessed that reliability requirements, which generally induce the creation of additional, backup edges, would ease the formation of the clique. The next proposition shows that this naive assumption is wrong, and in fact, as the frequency of failure increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the major player's clique.
Proposition 13: Assume the frequency of failures is high, namely δ = 1. Then, the type-A players form a clique if and only if c A < A/2. Allowing monetary transfers does not change the result.
Proof's Sketch: Consider a dense set, in which every player may access every other players within two hops by at least two disjoint paths. A direct link between two players only reduces their mutual distance by one, and does not affect any other distance. If this link fails often, it may be used only partially, and it may not be worthy to pay its cost. Hence, in this setting, counter intuitively, frequent failures end up with a sparser network.
The next proposition describes a scenario in which, surprisingly, the additional reliability constraints reduce the social cost. Proof's Sketch (Details in [18] ): In the optimal, yet unstable solution, every minor player established a link with all the major players. This configuration is unstable, and the optimal stable solution with survivability considerations is obtained by diluting this network so that every minor player will connect to just two major players. If the reliability requirements are further removed, an additional dilution occurs, increasing the social cost. In other words, the stable configuration is under-saturated with edges, and the additional survivability requirements facilitate the formation of additional links.
In conclusion, if the failure frequency is high, the survivability requirements will induce dilution of the clique of major players. However, the opposite effect occurs along the graph cut-set between the minor players set and the major players set, where the additional constraints lead to an increased number of links connecting major and minor players.
So far we have assumed that the reliability requirements are symmetric. As explained in the introduction, in some cases it is reasonable to assume that players will require a backup route only to the major players, i.e., non-symmetric reliability constraints. In this case, the social cost may deteriorate considerably. Hence, from a system designer point of view, it is much more important to incentivize a configuration where the reliability requirements are symmetric, than to reduce failure frequency globally.
Theorem 15: Consider a network such that T B T A 1.
The Price of Anarchy is as follows:
A) In a setting with asymmetric reliability requirements (τ = 0): unbounded. B) In a setting with symmetric reliability requirements (τ = 0): bounded by o(c).
Proof's Sketch (Details in [18] ): The first part is proved by considering a network where all minor players are connected to a single, designated, major player ( Fig. 2(a) ). There exists a single path of at most two hops between every minor player to every major player. However, as the stability requirements are asymmetric, the major players have no incentive to establish additional routes to any minor player, and the reliability requirements of the minor players remain unsatisfied. In this stabilizable network the social cost is unbounded. The proof of the second part is similar to Proposition 10's proof.
If monetary transfers are feasible, players may compensate other players for the cost of additional links such that all the additional constraints are satisfied. Therefore, in this setting, in contrast to the previous setting, there always exists a fallback route between every two players, regardless of the symmetric or asymmetric nature of the additional survivability constraints. Similarly to Theorem 12, as the number of ASs increases in time, the incentive of a player to reduce both its shortest route and the fallback route increases. This predicts that the maximal cycle length should decrease in time. Hence, symmetry is less important than in the previous scenario. We shall verify this prediction in Section V.
Proposition 16: Assume 1 < c < A/2. Then, every two players are connected by a cycle, and the maximal cycle length is bounded by
Proof: Denote the maximal distance between a type-A player and a type B player by k A . First, we are going to show that the maximal cycle length connecting a major player and a minor player is 2k A +1. This follows from a simple geometric argument. Consider two players, i ∈ T A and j ∈ T B . Assume k A > 2. If the cycle length is 2k A + 2 or greater, there exists a type-B node that its distance k A + 1, in contradiction to the assumption that the maximal distance between a major player and and a minor player is k A . Denote the maximal distance between two minor players by k B . A similar argument shows that maximal cycle length between two minor players is 2k B + 1.
Next, are going to show that the maximal distance connecting a major player and a minor player is
We prove by negation. Assume that the distance between player j ∈ T A and i ∈ T B is l. Denote the nodes on the path as (x 0 = i, x 1 , x 2 . . . , x l = j ). Then, by establishing a link between them, the distance between j and {x 0 , x 1 . . . x l/2 } (similarly, and distance between player i and players {x l/2 . . . x l−1 }) is reduced. In addition, player i reduces its distance to every node of the type-A clique by l. Reference [16, Lemma 25] shows that the total reduction in distance is l 2 − 1 + mod(l + 1, 2) /4. Then, by establishing the link (i, j ) we have
this expression is negative. Therefore, the link will be established, and the maximal shortest distance between a major player and a minor player is smaller than l. This concludes the proof.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DYNAMICS
The Internet is a rapidly evolving network. In fact, it may very well be that it would never reach an equilibrium as ASs emerge, merge, and draft new contracts among them. Therefore, a dynamic analysis is a necessity. We first define the dynamic rules. Then, we analyze the basin of attractions of different states, indicating which final configurations are possible and what their likelihood is. We shall establish that reasonable dynamics converge to just a few equilibria. Furthermore, we investigate the speed of convergence, and show that convergence time is linear in the number of players. Lastly, we identify prevalent network motifs [25] , i.e., small subgraphs that emerge during the natural evolution of the network, that arise due to survivability constraints. In Section V we show that these motifs are indeed ubiquitous in the real AS topology, and that the frequency of their occurrences is few folds more than expected in a random network.
A. Setup and Definitions
We split the game into turns, where at each turn only a single player is allowed to remove or initiate the formation of links. At each point in time, or turn, the players that already joined the game form a subset N ⊂ T A ∪ T B . We shall implicitly assume that the cost function is calculated with respect to the set N of players that are already present in the network. Each turn is divided into moves, at each of which a player either forms or removes a single link. A player's turn is over when it has no incentive to perform additional moves. Note that disconnections of several links can be done unilaterally and hence iteratively.
During player's i turn, all the other players act in a greedy, rather than strategic, manner. For example, although it may be that player j prefers that a link (i, j ) would be established for some j = j , it will accept the establishment of the less favorable link (i, j ), as long as its formation is beneficial to it. In other words, the active player has the advantage of initiation and the other players react to its offers. There are numerous scenarios in which players cannot fully forecast other players' moves and offers, e.g., when information is asymmetric or when only partial information is available [22] . In these settings, it is likely that a greedy strategy will become the modus operandi of many players. This is also a prevalent strategy when the system evolves rapidly and it is difficult to assess the current network state and dynamics.
Definition 17: Dynamic Rule #1: Assume it is player i 's turn and let the set of links at its mth move be denoted as E m . In player i 's mth move, it may remove a link (i, j ) ∈ E m or, if player j agrees, it may establish the link
This is reminiscent of the dynamics described in [19] and [26] . There, an "active" edge was drawn randomly, and the corresponding agents acted myopically. Here, we assume at any given time an agent, rather than an edge, is active. This adds another strategic, realistic layer, as the active agent may decide which edges to modify and in which order.
A key question is: Can a player temporarily disconnects itself from the graph, only to reconnect after getting to a better bargaining position? Or must a player stay connected? If the timescale in which the costs are evaluated is comparable to the timescale in which the dynamics occur, then, clearly, a player will not disconnect from the network voluntarily. However, if the latter is much shorter, it may, for a very brief time, disconnect itself from the graph in order to perform some strategic move. If player i cannot temporarily increase its cost, then it will only act such that on each move (rather than on each turn) its cost will reduce. The following rules address the two alternative limits.
Definition 18: Dynamic Rule #2a: A link (i, j ) will be added if i asks to form this link and C( j ; E m + i j) < C( j ; E m ). In addition, any link (i, j ) may be removed at move m.
Dynamic Rule #2b: In addition to Dynamic Rule #2a, player i may remove a link (i, j ) only if C(i ; E m − i j) < C(i ; E m ) and may establish a link (i, j ) if both C( j ; E m + i j) < C( j ; E m ) and C(i ; E m + i j) < C(i ; E m ).
If the game follows the stricter Dynamic Rule #2b, a player's cost must be reduced at each move, hence such multi-move plan is not possible. In the following, we consider two playing orders. First, in a round-robin playing order a permutation of 1 . . . n is randomly (uniformly) selected, and players play in a circular order. In a random-play order, at each turn a player is randomly (uniformly) picked as the active player.
B. Basic Model -Results
After mapping the possible dynamics, we are at a position to consider the different equilibria's basins of attraction. Specifically, we shall establish that, in most settings, the system converges to the optimal network, and if not, then the network's social cost is asymptotically equal to the optimal social cost. The reason behind this result is that a disconnected player has an immense bargaining power, and may force its optimal choice. As the highest connected node is usually the optimal communication partner for other nodes, new arrivals may force links between them and this node, forming a starlike structure. There may be few star centers in the graphs, but as one emerges from the other, the distance between them is small, yielding an optimal (or almost optimal) cost.
Theorem 19: If the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1 and #2a, then, in any playing order: a) The system converges to a solution in which the total cost is at most
b) Convergence to the optimal stable solution occurs if either:
1) A·k A > k +1, where k ≥ 0 is the number of type-B nodes that first join the network, followed later by k A consecutive type-A nodes ("initial condition").
2
) A · |T A | > |T B | ("final condition"). c) In all of the above, if every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps. Otherwise, if players play in a uniformly random order (random-play), the probability the system has not converged by turn t decays exponentially with t.
Proof's Sketch [18] : We monitor the network state at any turn and show that the minor players are organized in two stars, one centered about a minor player and one centered about a major player. Some cross links may be present. The first few type-B players, in the absence of a type-A player, will form a star. The star center can be considered as a new type of player, with an intermediate importance. We analyze the dynamics of the star's client base. As the latter increases, the incentive of a major player to link to the star center is increased. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of the star's center in the eyes of minor players, creating a positive feedback loop. Additional links connecting it to all the major players will be established, ending up with the star's center transformation into a member of the type-A clique. If, on the other hand, the star center is not attractive enough, minor players may disconnect from it and establish direct links with the type-A clique, thus reducing its importance and establishing a negative feedback loop. The star will become empty, and the star's center x will be become a stub of a major player, like every other type-B player. The system reaches an equilibrium where either all the minor player's are in star's client base or the client base is empty. This dynamic process shows how an effectively new major player emerges out of former type-B members in a natural way. Interestingly, Theorem 19 also shows that there exists a transient state with a better social cost than the final state. In fact, in a certain scenario, the transient state is better than the optimal stable state.
So far we have discussed the possibility that a player may perform a strategic plan, implemented by Dynamic Rule #2a. However, if we follow Dynamic Rule #2b instead, then a player may not disconnect itself from the graph.
Proposition 20: If the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1 and #2b, then the system will converge to a solution in which the total cost is at most
Moreover, if every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps. Otherwise, if players play in a uniformly random order (random-play), the probability the system has not converged by turn t decays exponentially with t.
Proof's Sketch [18] : The previous results indicate that it is not worthy to add additional links to type-B nodes. Therefore, no links will be added except for the initial ones, or, in other words, renegotiation will always fail. Initially, the dynamics are similar to the previous setup, and the players are organized in at most two stars, one about a major player and one about a minor player. However, as players may not disconnect from the network, even if one star becomes increasingly dominant, players in the other star may not switch to it. At the worse case scenario, each star contains half of the minor players. The mean distance between two minor players is the dominant term in the social cost, and it is increased from two to three.
Theorem 19 and Proposition 20 show that the intermediate network structures of the type-B players are not necessarily trees, and additional links between tier two players may exist, as found in reality. Furthermore, our model predicts that some cross-tier links, although less likely, may be formed as well. If Dynamic Rule #2a is in effect, These structures are only transient, otherwise they might remain permanent.
The dynamical model can be easily generalized to accommodate various constraints. Geographical constraints may limit the service providers of the minor player. The resulting type-B structures represent different geographical regions. Likewise, in remote locations state legislation may regulate the Internet infrastructure. If at some point regulation is relaxed, it can be modeled by new players that suddenly join the game.
C. Monetary Transfers Dynamics
We now consider the dynamic process of network formation under the presence of monetary transfers. For every node i there may be several nodes, indexed by j, such that C( j, i j) + C(i, i j) < 0, and player i needs to decide on the order of players with which it will ask to form links. Each player's decision is myopic, and is based solely on the current state of the network. Hence, the order of establishing links is important, and may depends on the pricing mechanism. There are several alternatives and, correspondingly, several possible ways to specify player i's preferences, each leading to a different dynamic rule.
Perhaps the most naive assumption is that if for player j, C( j, i j) > 0, then the price it will ask player i to pay is P i j = max{ C( j, i j), 0}. In other words, if it is beneficial for player j to establish a link, it will not ask for a payment in order to do so. Otherwise, it will demand the minimal price that compensates for the increase in its costs. This dynamic rule represents an efficient market. This suggests the following preference order rule.
Definition 21: Preference Order #1: Player i will establish a link with a player j such that C(i, i j) + min{ C( j, i j), 0} is minimal. The price player i will pay is P i j = max{ C( j, i j), 0}.
As established by the next theorem, Preference Order #1 leads to the optimal equilibrium fast.
Theorem 22: Assume the players follow Preference Order #1 and either Dynamic Rule #1. Additionally, players follow either Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b. If A+1 2 > c, then the system converges to the optimal solution. If every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after o(N) steps. Otherwise, e.g., if players play in a random order (randomplayer), convergence occurs exponentially fast.
Proof's Sketch [18] : If the clique is large enough, then it is worthy for a type-B player to establish a direct link to the clique, compensating a type-A player, and follow this move by disconnecting from its intermediate supplier. Therefore, monetary transfers increase flexibility, enabling players to escape from an unfortunate position. If A+1 2 > c this results in the optimal configuration, as indicated by Proposition 11.
Yet, the common wisdom that monetary transfers, or utility transfers in general, should increase the social welfare, is contradicted in our setting by the following proposition. Specifically, there are certain instances, where allowing monetary transfers yields a decrease in the social utility.
Proposition 23: Assume A+1 2 ≤ c. Consider the case where monetary transfers are allowed and the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1,#2a and Preference Order #1. Then: a) The system either converges to the optimal solution or to a solution in which
In addition, if one of the first c − 1 nodes is of type-A then the system converges to the optimal solution. b) For some parameters and playing orders, the system converges to the optimal state if monetary transfers are forbidden, but when transfers are allowed it fails to do so. This is the case, for example, when the first k players are of type-B, and
Proof's Sketch [18] : Consider the scenario of Theorem 19, where the players are organized in at most two stars, one about a major player and one about a minor player. The star center may pay type-A players to establish links with her, reducing the motivation for one of her leafs to defect and in turn, increasing the incentive of the other players to directly connect to it. The end result is that all nodes will establish links with the minor star center, which is a sub-optimal configuration.
The latter proposition shows that monetary transfers facilitates link formation between the star's center and all the major players. Hence, it provides a mechanism for the emergence of an effectively new major player, namely the star center.
A more elaborate choice of a price mechanism is that of "strategic" pricing. Assume the link (i, j * ) carries the least utility for player i . It is reasonable to assume that player j * will ask a minimal price for it, as long as it is greater than its implied costs. We will denote this price as P i j * . Every other player x will use this value and demand an additional payment from player i , as the link (i, x) is better for player i. Definition 24: Pricing mechanism #2: Set j * as the node that maximizes
The price that player j requires in order to establish (i, j ) is P i j = max{0, α i j , − C( j, E +i j)}.
As far as player i is concerned, all the links (i, j ) such that P i j = α i j carry the same utility, and this utility is greater than the utility of links for which the former condition is invalidated. Some of these links have a better connection value, but they come at a higher price. Since all the links carry the same utility, we need to decide on some preference mechanism for player i . The simplest one is the "cheap" choice, by which we mean that, if there are a few equivalent links, then the player will choose the cheapest one. This can be reasoned by the assumption that a new player cannot spend too much resources, and therefore it will choose the "cheapest" option that belongs to the set of links with maximal utility.
Definition 25: Preference order #2: Player i will establish links with player j if player j minimizes C (i, i j) = C(i, i j)+ P i j and C (i, i j) < 0. If there are several players that minimize C (i, i j), then player i will establish a link with a player that minimizes P i j . If there are several players that satisfy the previous condition, then one of them is chosen randomly.
Note that low-cost links have a poor "connection value" and therefore the previous statement can also be formulated as a preference for links with low connection value.
Definition 26: Strategic Pricing Mechanism: Set j * as the node that maximizes C(i, E + i j * ). Set P * = max{− C( j * , E + i j * ), 0}. Denote the excess utility of the link (i, j ) as α i j = C(i, E + i j) − ( C(i, E + i j * ) + P * ) . The price player j requires in order to establish (i, j ) is
We proceed to consider the dynamic aspects of the system under such conditions. Proposition 27: Assume that: A) All Players follow Preference Order #2, Dynamic Rule #1, and either Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b.
B) The number of players
C) At least one out of the first m players is of type-A, where m satisfies m ≥ √ A 2 + 4c − 1 − A. Then, if players play in a round-robin order, the system converges to a state where all the type-B nodes are connected directly to the type-A clique, except perhaps lines of nodes with summed maximal length of m. In the large network limit, S/S optimal < 3/2 + c. D) If 2c > (A − 1) + |T B |/|T A | then the bound in (C) can be tightened to S/S optimal < 3/2.
Proof's Sketch [18] : We show that initially the structure is a type-A clique, and an additional line of type-B players connected to a single type-A player. For every new player, the link with the least utility is the link connecting the new arrival and the end of the type-B strand. Therefore, this line grows until a point where it is beneficial for a major player to establish a connection to some minor player along the line, effectively forming a new line of minor players which grows incrementally. The specified conditions forbid any deviation.
It is important to note that, although our model allows for monetary transfers, in every resulting agreement between major players no monetary transaction is performed. In other words, our model predicts that the major players clique will form a settlement-free interconnection subgraph, while in major player -minor player contracts monetary transactions will occur, and they will be of a transit contract type. Indeed, this observation is well founded in reality.
D. Network Motifs
In the Technical Report [18] we show that, under survivability constraints, during the natural evolution of the network a "double star" sub-graph, or network motif, often emerges. In the "double star" motif, as depicted in Fig. 3 , there exists a primary and a secondary star. All the minor players are connected to the primary star's center. Part of the players are also connected to the other star's center, forming the secondary star. Consider a region where it is immensely difficult to establish a link to a major player, either due to geographical distance, link prices or perhaps additional physical links are simply not accessible. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a reliable connection, there must be at least two links that connect this region to the Internet backbone via some major players. In order to provide a stable, fault tolerant service, every player in this region will form links with the players hosting the endpoints of these links, forming the double star sub-graph. Assume now that link prices reduce over time, or that the importance of a fast connection to the Internet core increases in time. In this case, players may decide to establish direct links with the major players, and remove either one of both links connecting them to the star centers. Note though, that players will be reluctant to disconnect from the star center if the number of nodes in the star is large.
An additional network motif, the "entangled cycles" motif, arises when monetary transfers are taken into account. This network motif is composed of a line (i.e., interconnected sequence) of minor players' nodes, with some cross-links Fig. 3 . Network Motifs. a) A network configuration which includes a "double-star" structure of minor players. Every node in the primary star (encircled in yellow) is linked to a major player, node k (in green). A direct link connects the two star centers, denoted by 1 and 2 (in pink). The members in the secondary star (in purple) are connected to both star centers. In addition, there secondary star center is also connected to the major player k. There might be additional minor players outside the stars (in red). b) The "entangled cycles" motif. Six minor player are connected in an "entangled cycles" subgraph. The first two nodes have direct connection to some major player, and access the rest of the network by the major player's additional links, represented by the dotted line. c) If at some point, a link between a player in this subgraph and some external player is formed (in this example, a major player), some links may be removed without violating the reliability requirement and without increasing the distance cost appreciably. The removed links marked by a red X. between the nodes along this line, breaking the hierarchy (Fig. 3) . The "entangled cycle" of length three is the "feedback loop" motif, which was previously found to exist in a higher frequency than expected in the Internet graph [25] .
This shows that reliability is a major factor in breaking up tree hierarchy in the Internet. In addition, it also hints that the hierarchical structure does not break frequently in the top levels of the Internet, but rather mostly in the intermediate and lower tiers. We showed in [18] that in large networks the length of the "entangled motifs" is short. Therefore, we do not expect to see excessively long structures, but rather small ones, having just a few ASs.
V. DATA ANALYSIS In this section we compare our theoretical findings with actual monthly snapshots of the inter-AS connectivity, reconstructed from BGP update messages [27] .
Our model predicts that, for A > c A > 1, the type-A ("major league") players will form a highly connected subset, specifically a clique (Section III-A). The type-B players, in turn, form structures that are connected to the clique. Figure 4 presents the graph of a subset of the top 100 ASs per January 2006, according to CAIDA ranking [28] . It is visually clear that the inter-connectivity of this subset is high. Indeed, the top 100 ASs graph density, which is the ratio between the number of links present and the number of possible links, is 0.23, compared to a mean 0.024 ± 0.004 for a random connected set of 100.We obtained similar results by ranking the top ASs using various topological measures, such as betweeness, closeness and k-core analysis.
In the dynamic aspect, we expect the type-A players subgraph to converge to a complete graph in time. We evaluate the mean node-to-node distance in this subset as a function of time by using quarterly snapshots of the AS graph from January, 2006 to October, 2008. Indeed, the mean distance decreases approximately linearly. The result is presented in Fig. 5(a) . Also, the distance value tends to 1, indicating the almost-completeness of this sub-graph.
Although, in principle, there are many structures the type-B players ("minor players") may form, the dynamics we considered indicates the prevalence of stars and lines (Sections IV-B and IV-C). While the partition of ASs to just two types is a simplification, we still expect our model to predict fairly accurately the structures at the limits of highimportance ASs and marginal ASs. A k-core of a graph is the maximal connected subgraph in which all nodes have degree of at least k. The k-shell is obtained after the removal of all the k-core nodes. In Fig. 4 , a snapshot of the sub-graph of the marginal ASs is presented, using a k-core separation (k = 3), where all the nodes in the higher cores are removed. The abundance of lines and stars is visually clear. In addition, the spanning tree of this subset, which consists of 75% of the ASs in the Internet, is formed by removing just 0.02% of the links in this sub-graph, a strong indication for a forest-like structure.
For a choice of core C , the node-core distance of a node i / ∈ C is defined as the shortest path from node i to any node in the core. In Section III-A, we showed that, by allowing monetary transfers, the maximal distance of a type-B player to the type-A clique (the maximal "node-core distance" in our model) depends inversely on the number of nodes in the clique and the number of players in general. Likewise, we expect the mean "node-core" distance to depend inversely on the number of nodes in the clique. The number of ASs increases in time, and we may assume the number of type-A players follows. Therefore, we expect a decrease of the aforementioned mean "node-core distance" in time. Fig 5(a) shows the mean distance of the secondary leading 2000 ASs, ranked 101-2100 in CAIDA ranking, from the set of the top 100 nodes. The distance decreases in time, in agreement with our model. Similarly, In Section III-E, we showed that, if the AS are constrained by survivability requirements, mostly applicable in the intermediate and top tiers of the Internet, the cycle length connecting a major player to a minor player depends inversely on the number of major players. The steady decline of the cycle's length in time is predicted by our model (see [18, Sec. V] ).
It is widely assumed that the evolvement of the Internet follows a "preferential attachment" process [29] . According to this process, the probability that a new node will attach to an existing node is proportional (in some models, up to some power) to the existing node's degree. An immediate corollary is that the probability that a new node will connect to any node in a set of nodes is proportional to the set's sum of degrees. The sum of degrees of the secondary ASs set is ∼1.9 greater than the sum of degrees in the core, according to the examined data [27] . Therefore, a "preferential attachment" class model predicts that a new node is likely to attach to the shell rather than to the core. As all the nodes in the shell have a distance of at least one from the core, the new node's distance from the core will be at least two. Since the initial mean "shell-core" distance is ∼1.26, a model belonging to the "preferential attachment" class predicts that the mean distance will be pushed to two, and in general increase over time. However, this is contradicted by the data that shows ( Fig 5) a decrease of the aforementioned distance. The slope of the latter has the 95% confidence bound of (−3.1 · 10 −3 , −2.3 · 10 −3 ) hops/month, a strong indication of a negative trend, in disagreement with the "preferential attachment" model class. In contrast, this trend is predicted by our model, per the discussion in Section III-D. In fact, if the Internet is described by a random, power law ("scale free") network, then the mean distance should grow as (log N) or (log log N) ( [30] ). However, experimental observations shows that the mean distance grows slower than that ( [31] ), and in fact it may even be reduced with the network size, as predicted by our model.
Our analysis showed that in most of the generated topologies, the minor players are organized in small subgraphs that have direct connection to the Internet core, namely the major players clique, or the tier-1 subgraph. In order to maintain a reliable connection, in each subgraph there must be at least two links that connect minor players to the core. Indeed, we have found out that the ratio between the mean number of disjoint paths from a minor player to the core and the mean degree of minor players is more than 0.95, and it increases in time ( Fig. 5(b) ). That is, almost every outgoing link of a minor player is used to provide it with an additional, disjoint path to the core. In other words, a player is more likely to establish an additional link, hence increase its degree, if it supplies it with a new path to the core that does not intersect its current paths.
In Section IV we predicted the ubiquity of two network motifs, the "double star" motif ( Fig. 3(a) ) and the "entangled cycles" motif ( Fig. 3(b) ). We define the occurrence of a "double star" motif as the existence of a connected pair of nodes, each with degree greater than m, designated as the centers, such that at least m neighbors of one center are also neighbors of the other center (Fig. 6 ). We generated random networks according to the Configuration Model (CM), in which each node is given a number of stubs according to its degree, and stubs are connected uniformly. Then, we evaluated the mean number of occurrences of this motif in a random CM network with the same number of nodes and the same degree distribution as the real inter-AS topology. For m = 2, we have found 28.8K occurrences in the real-world inter-AS topology, whereas the mean number of occurrences in the random CM network was only 5.8K ± 1.3K instances (the ± indicates standard deviation). Namely, there are more than four times and 12 standard deviations displays of this subgraph in the Internet than in a random network with the same degree distribution. Chebyshev's inequality provides a bound on the p-value, p < 0.003. This low value indicates that it is highly unlikely that a random CM network explains the frequent appearance of this network motif. We have tested the prevalence of this motif with other values of m and the number of occurrences is consistently a few times more than expected in a random CM network. Our analysis suggests that reliability considerations is one of the factors leading to the increased number of incidents.
The unexpected prevalence of the "feedback loop", which is a special case of the "entangled cycles" motif, was first reported in [25] . The "feedback loop" motif coincides with the "entangled cycles" motif of length three. In order to further assess our results we tested for the occurrence frequency of the "entangled cycles" motif of length four. We compared the number of occurrences of this motif in the real-world Internet graph to the expected number of occurrences in a random CM network. While the number of instances of this motif in the Internet graph was 27.7M, the expected number of occurrences in the random network was only 1.3M ± 0.8M. The abundance of this network motif, an order of magnitude greater than expected ( p < 0.001, a relaxed bound based on Chebyshev's inequality) provides a positive indication to the implications of survivability requirements.
In summary, we provided both static and dynamic empirical evidence that conform with our predictions.
VI. DISCUSSION
Does the Internet resembles a clique or a tree? Is it contracting or expanding? How do reliability requirements affect the topological structure of the Internet? The game theoretic model presented in this work suggests potential answers to such questions by addressing the different roles ASs play.
Our model incorporates four key ingredients: heterogeneous players, link and distance costs, monetary transfer and survivability requirements. There are two types of players, minor and major players, and each player weighs the distance to major player by a factor |A| > 1 in its cost function. Additionally, ASs incur costs due to link maintenance. Players may transfer utility via monetary transactions, or contract. Finally, players may, if applicable, require a backup path to a subset of ASs.
The key results are as follows. The static analysis has indicated that in all equilibria, the major players form a clique. Our model predicts that the major players clique will form a settlement-free interconnection subgraph, while in major player-minor player contracts transactions will occur, and they will be of a transit contract type. This observation is supported by empirical evidences, based on the analysis of the dense tier-1 subgraph.
We established the Price of Reliability, which measures the excess social cost 1 that is required in order to maintain network survivability in an optimal stable equilibrium. Surprisingly, we showed that it can be smaller than one, that is, the additional survivability constraints add to the social utility. This is a meaningful insight for an incentive design mechanism that will promote reliability. We also showed that reliability requirements have disparate effects on different parts of the network. While it may support dilution in dense areas, it facilitates edges formation in sparse areas, and in particular it supports the formation of edges connecting minor players and major players.
This work goes beyond traditional static game theoretical analysis and discusses multiple dynamics, which represent different scenarios and playing orders. The dynamic analysis showed that, when the individual players act selfishly and rationally, the system will converge to either the optimal configuration or to a state in which the social cost differs by a negligible amount from the optimal social cost. This is important as a prospective mechanism design. We also showed that, as the number of major players increase, the distance of the minor players to the core should decrease. This was also confirmed empirically. In the dynamics analysis we found the repetitive appearance of small sub-graphs, or network motifs, namely the "entangled cycles" motif and the "double star" motif. Indeed, the number of occurences of these motifs in the real Inter-AS topology surpassed the expected number of occurrences in a CM model by more than 10 standard deviations, indicating that additional factors support their formation, and as our analysis shows, survivability is one of them.
Our model abstracts a few important realistic elements away. Friction limits the contracting options an AS has, and confines an AS to previous contracts. In the absence of friction, the analytic discussion shows that in time, minor ASs establish links with nodes in higher tiers than their current provider, effectively reducing their tier number. Friction may delay or even postpone such promotion to lower tiers. Furthermore, it may inflate the network, increasing its depth (the maximal distance from the core) as new AS will contract to lower tier AS, which will not promote quickly. Limited information will prevent players from preforming the optimal move, inducing irregularity in the network structure. In particular, we might expect additional "semi-stable" network motifs, as the incentive of a distant node to establish a link to a network motif subgraph depends heavily on the internal structure and local network connections.
A preliminary discussion of local constraints appears in Section IV-D, where we show how a double-star motif naturally emerges in a region with a limited number of external links, possibly due to geographical restrictions. Additionally, we may expect players to play a local network formation game with the other ASs in the confined region, subject to the fixed assignment of infrastructure connecting this region with the rest of the Internet. This may lead to a hierarchy of network motifs, or multi-scale network structures. We plan to broaden our investigation and address this topics in future research.
